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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Emails released beginning in the fall of 2014 demonstrate several improper private
communications between high-level utility officials and decision-makers at the California Public
Utility Commission (“CPUC”). 1 The email chains show discussions ranging from a utility
repeatedly lobbying on the outcome of an enforcement matter or aggressively pushing for a new
judge assignment, to a commissioner soliciting donations to a political campaign or a banquet
fund. Entities in the transportation industry have also alleged improper contacts with CPUC
officials. 2 In each instance, the CPUC decision-makers did not report the communications or
insist that the utilities stop sending them. Rather, they actively participated in the exchangesand,
if anything, encouraged them.
In the judicial and adjudicatory context, courts, legislatures and public agencies have long
prohibited private communications with decision-makers to ensure a fair outcome and preserve
the integrity of governmental action. These private communications are called ex parte contacts.
Even though the CPUC uses a judicial-type of process to gather information for the record and
allow for argument by interested parties, it broadly permits ex parte contacts in ratemaking
proceedings, which are the majority of the CPUC’s contested cases. In addition, as many of the
revealed emails indicate, some CPUC decision-makers have allowed for ex parte
communications in circumstances in which all such contacts are strictly prohibited. Many
decision-makers in the CPUC regularly engage in off-the-record communications with utilities
and other stakeholders, creating a culture of conversations with parties occurring behind closed
doors. The recent disclosures have caused many to seriously question the CPUC’s decisionmaking process.
To restore the integrity of the CPUC’s process, the agency and the legislature should
change the applicable rules. An analysis of practices in other state and federal agencies reveals
that federal regulators, other California agencies, and utility regulators in most other states make
similar decisions without allowing for ex parte contacts. While the CPUC places no constraints
on private communications related to legislative rulemaking proceedings, many ex parte rules
examined in this analysis take a more nuanced approach and focus on whether a proceeding is
contested, hearings are held, or substantive rights might be affected.
The CPUC should follow the lead of many similar states, agencies, and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and prohibit ex parte communications in all contested
proceedings, defined to include all ratesetting and adjudicatory procedures, and any other matter
that requires hearings and affects an individual entity’s substantive rights. This prohibition need
not restrict the ability of CPUC decision-makers to hold properly noticed meetings which all
parties can attend. Through its rules, the CPUC should require that decision-makers avoid
1

See, e.g., PG&E Late Notice of Ex Parte Contacts (October 6 2014), available at
http://www.pgecorp.com/sfg14/PGE_LateNotice.pdf
2
See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, Complaints About PG&E’s Secret Meetings Mirrored in “RideSharing” Proceedings, SAN FRANCISCO BUSINESS TIMES, November 7, 2014, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/11/public-utilities-cpuc-peevey-uber-lyftsidecar.html?page=all.
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improper ex parte contacts, report on such communications when they do occur, and allow other
parties a chance to respond. Finally, the ex parte rules should provide clear explanations about
what types of communications are truly procedural and thus not subject to the ex parte rules.
II.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Ex parte communication is defined under the federal Administrative Procedures Act as
“an oral or written communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable
prior notice to all parties is not given, but it shall not include requests for status reports on any
matter or proceeding covered by this subchapter.” 3 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ex parte”
similarly as “on one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application
of, one party only.”
A. PURPOSE OF EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS
One of the primary purposes of restrictions on ex parte contacts with decisionmakers is to prevent a party from gaining an unfair advantage in a contested matter. 4 By
not being subject to the adversarial process, ex parte contacts violate the right to a fair
hearing. 5 Ex parte contacts generally cannot be rebutted in the adversarial process. 6
And, problematically, an ex parte contact may carry disproportionate weight in the
decision-making process. 7
Improper ex parte communications have been referred to as fraud on the court,
because they interfere with the decision-makers ability to make a fair decision. 8 As one
court summarized: “a party’s right to due process is violated when the agency decision-

3

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (14).
Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee, 984 F.2d 1534, 1543 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that in the Endangered Species context “[b]asic fairness requires that ex parte
communications play no part in Committee adjudications, which involve high stakes for all the
competing interests and concern issues of supreme national importance.”); C. Wolfram, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, § 11.3 (“The purpose of the prohibition [on ex parte contacts] . . . is to prevent the
communicating side from gaining an unfair advantage in the litigation.”)
5
C. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 11.3 (“Such contacts violate the right of every party to a
fair hearing, a corollary of which is the right to hear all evidence and argument offered by an
adversary. The violation is particularly acute because the calculated secretiveness of such
communications strongly suggests their inaccuracy.”)
6
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 563
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee, 984 F.2d 1534,
1543 (9th Cir. 1993) (listing cases).
7
John Allen, Combinations of Decision-making Functions, Ex Parte Communications, and
Related Biasing Influences: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH LAW REVIEW 1135, 1197
(1993) (“Unchallenged evidence or arguments are more salient, more likely to be recalled by the
decision maker, and more likely to carry inordinate weight in the mental process of reaching a
final conclusion.”)
8
See, e.g., State ex. Rel. Corbin v. Arizona Corp. Com’n, 143 Ariz. 219 (1984).
4
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maker improperly allows ex parte communications from one of the parties to the
controversy.” 9
Allowing ex parte contacts can essentially nullify the public’s right to attend and
participate in agency decisions. As the Ninth Circuit observed:
The public’s right to attend all Committee meetings, participate in all Committee
hearings, and have access to all Committee records would be effectively nullified
if the Committee were permitted to base its decisions on the private conversations
and secret talking points and arguments to which the public and the participating
parties have no access. 10
The D.C. Circuit has further stated that ex parte contacts make a “mockery of justice”:
We think it is a mockery of justice to even suggest that judges or other decisionmakers may be properly approached on the merits of a case during the pendency
of an adjudication. Administrative and judicial adjudication are viable only so
long as the integrity of the decisionmaking process remains inviolate. There
would be no way to protect the sanctity of the adjudicatory process if we were to
condone direct attempts to influence decision-makers through ex parte contacts. 11
In addition to issues of general fairness and possible taint of the decision, ex parte contacts can
also damage the “integrity of the decision making process itself, and the public’s perception of
the process.” 12
B. THE MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT EX PARTE RULES
In the early 1980s, the Model Administrative Procedure Act was revised to include a
prohibition of ex parte contacts in agency adjudication proceedings. The 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act was enacted by many states including Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Tennessee and
Wyoming. 13 It provides that:
. . .unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters specifically authorized
by statute, a presiding officer serving in an adjudicative proceeding may not
communicate directly or indirectly, regarding any issue in the proceeding, which
the proceeding is pending, with any party, with any person who has a direct or
9

State ex. Rel. Corbin v. Arizona Corp. Com’n, 143 Ariz. 219 (1984).
Portland Audubon Society v. Endangered Species Committee, 984 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir.
1993) (citing United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
11
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 570
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
12
Re Contacts Between Public Utilities and Former Commissioners, 82 P.U.R.4th 559, 1987 WL
257598 (Minn. P.U.C. 1987).
13
Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet _ Model State Administrative Procedure Act
(1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (1981).
10
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indirect interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or with any person who
presided at a previous stage of the proceeding, without notice and opportunity for
all parties to participate in the communication. 14
The Model Administrative Procedure Act (APA) further provides that members of multi-member
panels may communicate with each other and work with staff as long as the staff does not
receive ex parte communications. 15 If an ex parte communication is received, the Model APA
requires that it be put on the record and that other parties have an opportunity to rebut it. 16
Finally, the Model APA provides for disqualification of a presiding officer receiving an ex parte
communication and possibly disciplinary actions for a willful violation of the ex parte rules. 17
The Model APA does not require oral communications to be included in the rulemaking record,
stating “it would be undesirable to require all oral communications pertinent to every rulemaking proceeding to be electronically recorded or reduced to writing and to be included in the
rule-making record.” 18
The Model State APA was revised in 2010. The new model rules broadened the scope of
the ex parte prohibition to cover communications related to a pending case, rather than to just
communications related to issues in the proceeding. 19 The revision also limited an agency head
to only have communications with staff that do not “augment, diminish or modify the evidence
in the agency hearing record” to communications that either “explains technical or scientific
evidence, explains precedent or policies, or otherwise does not address the weight, sufficiency,

14

1981 Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 4-213 (1981),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state%20administrative%20procedure/msapa81.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
1981 Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 4-213 (1981). This section provides: “If
necessary to eliminate the effect of an ex parte communication received in violation of this
section, a presiding officer who receives the communication may be disqualified and the portions
of the record pertaining to the communication may be sealed by protective order.” Id. It further
provides that: “The agency shall, and any party may, report any willful violation of this section to
appropriate authorities for any disciplinary proceedings provided by law. In addition, each agency
by rule may provide for appropriate sanctions, including default, for any violations of this
section.” Id.
18
1981 Model Administrative Procedure Act, Comment to § 3-112 (citing sources), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state%20administrative%20procedure/msapa81.pdf.
The model rule comment also states that “Of course, if an agency wants to impose on itself by
rule such a prohibition on ex parte oral communications in rulemaking, or a requirement that all
such oral communications be related to writing and included in the agency rule-making record, it
may do so.” Id.
19
2010 Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 408, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state%20administrative%20procedure/msapa_final_10.
pdf.
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or quality of the evidence.” 20 The 2010 revision also specified that only uncontested procedural
matters fall under an exception to the ex parte prohibition.21
III.

CPUC’S EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS

A. CPUC’S CURRENT EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS
The California Public Utilities Code defines ex parte communication as: “any oral or
written communication between a decision-maker and a person with an interest in a matter
before the commission concerning substantive, but not procedural issues, that does not occur in a
public hearing, workshop, or other public proceeding, or on the official record of the proceeding
on the matter.” 22 The statute defines “[p]erson with an interest” as:
(A) Any applicant, an agent or an employee of the applicant, or a person receiving
consideration for representing the applicant, or a participant in the proceeding on
any matter before the commission.
(B) Any person with a financial interest. . . in a matter before the commission, or
an agent or employee of the person with a financial interest, or a person receiving
consideration for representing the person with a financial interest.
(C) A representative acting on behalf of any civic, environmental, neighborhood,
business, labor, trade, or similar organization who intends to influence the
decision of a commission member on a matter before the commission.
The statute further describes some requirements for the CPUC’s ex parte rules including that:
“reportable communications shall be reported by the party” even if the decision-maker initiated
it; notice of communications should be reported within three working days; notices should
describe the people present at the communication and the “date, time, and location of the
communication, and whether it was oral, written, or a combination,” and the notice shall describe
the “party’s, but not the decision-maker’s communication and its content.” 23
The statute further specifies that ex parte communications are prohibited in adjudication
proceedings and allowed in rulemaking. 24 The statute’s language related to ratesetting
proceedings appear to be conflicting. It provides that:
Ex parte communications are prohibited in ratesetting cases. However, oral ex
parte communications may be permitted at any time by any commissioner if all
interested parties are invited and given not less than three days' notice. Written ex
20

2010 Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 408,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state%20administrative%20procedure/msapa_final_10.
pdf.
21
2010 Model Administrative Procedure Act, § 408,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state%20administrative%20procedure/msapa_final_10.
pdf.
22
Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.1
23
Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.1.
24
Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.2 (adjudication); Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.4.
7
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parte communications may be permitted by any party provided that copies of the
communication are transmitted to all parties on the same day. If an ex parte
communication meeting is granted to any party, all other parties shall also be
granted individual ex parte meetings of a substantially equal period of time and
shall be sent a notice of that authorization at the time that the request is granted.
In no event shall that notice be less than three days. The commission may
establish a period during which no oral or written ex parte communications shall
be permitted and may meet in closed session during that period, which shall not in
any circumstance exceed 14 days. If the commission holds the decision, it may
permit ex parte communications during the first half of the interval between the
hold date and the date that the decision is calendared for final decision. The
commission may meet in closed session for the second half of that interval. 25
One provision states that all parties need to be “invited and given not less than three days’
notice” for oral ex parte communications. Yet, another provision states that “individual ex parte
meetings” are allowed as a follow-up to any individual meeting that does occur, and the decision
maker must provide “a substantially equal period of time” for those follow-up meetings. This
conflict is discussed further below.
The CPUC’s regulations define ex parte communications as a written or oral
communication that:
(1) concerns any substantive issue in a formal proceeding,
(2) takes place between an interested person and a decision-maker, and
(3) does not occur in a public hearing, workshop, or other public forum noticed by
ruling or order in the proceeding, or on the record of the proceeding. 26
The rules further describe what types of communication are procedural and not subject to the ex
parte requirements: “[c]ommunications regarding the schedule, location, or format for hearings,
filing dates, identity of parties, and other such nonsubstantive information are procedural
inquiries, not ex parte communications.” 27 The rules specifically prohibit discussion relating to
the proper categorization of a proceeding and administrative law judge assignments. 28 The rules
define interested person consistent with the statutory definition. 29 The rules also apply to
advisors of the Commissioners: “[c]ommunication with Commissioners’ personal advisors are
subject to all of the restrictions on, and reporting requirements applicable to, ex parte
communications” except the requirement to provide equal time to parties. 30
The CPUC’s regulations follow the statutory mandate and divide its proceedings into
three categories: adjudicatory, quasi-legislative, or ratesetting. 31 In adjudicatory proceedings, ex
25

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1701.3.
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.1.
27
Id.
28
Id. at § 8.3.
29
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.1.
30
Id. at § 8.2
31
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.3
26
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parte contacts related to the substance are prohibited. 32 In quasi-legislative proceeding, ex parte
contacts are permitted. 33 In ratesetting proceedings, ex parte contacts are permitted if noticed to
other parties and other parties are given equal opportunity to meet with the Commissioner. 34 Ex
parte communications are not included in the record of the proceeding. 35
The CPUC’s rules interpret the potentially conflicting statutory language related to
ratemaking proceedings as allowing for oral ex parte contacts in ratemaking proceedings through
two different avenues: (1) all party meetings in which all parties are invited, and (2) individual
meetings as long as each party is given equal time. 36 Consistent with the statute, the regulations
also prohibit ex parte contacts in relation to a ratesetting deliberative meeting. 37 In the event of a
violation, the rules provide: “When the Commission determines that there has been a violation of
this rule or of Rule 8.4, the Commission may impose penalties and sanctions, or make any other
order, as it deems appropriate to ensure the integrity of the record and to protect the public
interest.” 38 The rules, as the statute prescribes, also require that the ex parte communication is
reported by the “interested person” even if the interested person did not initiate it. 39
B. ISSUES RELATED TO CPUC ‘S CURRENT EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS
1. Pervasive Ex Parte Contacts Both Proper and Improper
The CPUC ex parte rules broadly allow private contacts in ratemaking proceedings,
which are the majority of the CPUC’s contested proceedings, as long as the first such contact is
noticed to other parties at least three days in advance and then all contacts are noticed to other
parties after it has occurred. 40 Ratemaking proceedings are at the heart of what the CPUC does –
it passes judgment on the appropriate revenue requirement for a given utility, including such
things as the cost of new power contracts, safety programs and new infrastructure, which in turn
determines where most Californians get their electricity and how much it costs. In these
proceedings, the Commission also establishes rate design, which is critical to the allocation of
costs to various customer classes, and can have dramatic effect on the Commission’s ability to
achieve its policy objectives. Given the agency’s broad allowance of ex parte contacts, decisionmakers in the CPUC regularly engage in off-the-record communications with utilities and other
stakeholders, creating a culture of the exchange of information critical to Commission decisions
occurring behind closed doors. This seriously compromises the integrity and the fairness of the
process and the public’s right to have a meaningful say in the makeup of their electrical grid.

32

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.3.
Id.
34
Id. The rules also provide that the Commission may prohibit ex parte communications 14 days
before a vote on a proposed decision if a ratesetting deliberative meeting is held. Id.
35
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.3(k).
36
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.3.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.4.
40
See supra at pp. 8-9.
33
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Improper private contacts, such as those recently revealed, raise suspicions of wrongdoing and of an unfair process. The CPUC controversy is prompted solely by the revelation of
questionable emails. What has been said in face-to-face conversations and in other contexts?
Beyond the potential to effectively nullify the benefits of developing an administrative record in
a proceeding, such private conversations have no assurance of accuracy or completeness. The
decision-makers may be left with an impression that they understand the critical issues and
underlying facts, but then they are unlikely to take adequate steps to test that impression. In
addition, allowing private contacts, as California does, can consume significant amounts of
decision-makers time – time which could be better spent evaluating the official administrative
record. 41
2. The Statutory Language Allows for Ex Parte Communications in Ratesetting
Proceedings If All Parties Are Invited.
The statute appears to contain internal inconsistencies. It prohibits ex parte
communications in ratesetting matters unless “all interested parties are invited and given not less
than three days' notice.” This language is not limited to a subset of oral ex parte
communications. The plain language initially requires that all parties be invited for all oral ex
parte communications related to ratemaking proceedings. The statute then describes the notice
and equal-time requirement triggered if a decision-maker nonetheless grants a private meeting.
One implication is that private meetings are permitted in ratesetting matters if certain procedures
are met. A more restrictive interpretation is that the Legislature intended to eliminate and
prohibit private meetings and only included other procedures to protect all parties in the event
that a decision-maker violated the ban and undertook a private meeting.
A closer look at the legislative history suggests that the California Assembly preferred
the more restrictive interpretation. The Assembly’s Bill Analysis states:
Ratesetting cases shall be heard by either an ALJ or a commissioner as the
principal hearing officer. The principal hearing officer shall be present in at least
one-half of the hearings. The assigned commissioner shall be present for the
closing arguments. Ex parte communications are prohibited except: oral ex parte
communications may be permitted by any commissioner if all interested parties
are invited and given three days notice; and written ex parte communications may
be permitted if copies of that communication are transmitted on the same day. 42
Thus, the Assembly analysis seems to interpret the ratemaking provision as requiring all parties
to be invited to ex parte meetings. That same Assembly analysis describes the purpose of the
legislation as a “positive first step in transforming an agency designed to regulate monopolies
through command and control regulation to one with procedures more suited to the emerging
competitive utility marketplace.” 43

41

The authors are aware that the CPUC staff in Commissioners’ offices have raised this concern
in informal discussions.
42
California Bill Analysis, S.B. 960 Assem., 8/28/1996 (emphasis added).
43
California Bill Analysis, S.B. 960 Assem., 8/28/1996.
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That same day, the Senate released a conference report that described how the provision
allows ex parte communications as long as each party has equal opportunities. The report
provides:
The Conference amendments to SB 960 create three classes of cases within the
PUC: adjudication, ratesetting, and quasi-legislative. At the start of each case a
commissioner must issue a scoping memo which describes the issues and lays out
a timetable for resolution. In adjudication cases, where the PUC is acting like a
court, off-the-record, or ex parte, contact is prohibited. In ratesetting cases the
PUC may have ex parte contacts provided that all parties have an equal
opportunity for contact. Once the ex parte contact is ended the PUC may meet in
closed session to consider the case. In cases in which the PUC is setting policy
(quasi-legislative) a commissioner must be present for all formal hearings. To
facilitate the free flow of information, there are no ex parte contact restrictions. 44
This focus on an equal opportunity for contact in the Senate’s report is different from the focus
on inviting all parties suggested by the Assembly report, but the two can be read to be consistent.
If all parties are invited to ex parte meetings, then all parties will be given equal opportunity for
contact.
Later reports suggest that Senate Bill 960, which added the relevant language, was
intended to reduce ex parte contacts. For example, one report related to Senate Bill 779 states
that: “SB 960 also created new stricter rules governing off-the-record (ex parte)
communications.” 45
Regardless of how one were to reconcile these mixed messages, two things are clear.
First, the Commission’s rules implementing the statute do not reflect the legislative preference to
discourage, if not entirely ban, ex parte communications in ratesetting proceedings. Instead, the
Commission’s rules swing the door wide open and focus on notice and filing requirements,
implying that all private communications in such proceedings are welcome. Second, although
the ban on communication in both the adjudicatory and ratesetting contexts is stated in terms
general enough to apply to all participants, including decision-makers, the Commission’s rules
and practice impose the prohibition only on interested parties, and set forth no responsibilities for
commissioners and other decision-makers other than the obligation to entertain equal-time
meetings in ratesetting cases. In addition, consistent with statutory requirements, the
Commission has created rules that place the obligation to report on ex parte communications
squarely on the shoulders of interested parties, who are in turn prohibited from reporting on what
a decision-maker might have said at that meeting. While most other jurisdictions impose the
reporting requirement on the decision-makers themselves, CPUC commissioners and other
decision-makers take no formal responsibility to inform other parties or the general public about
their private conversations. In short, the CPUC decision-makers have left themselves with no
44

California Bill Analysis, S.B. 960, 8/28/1996 (emphasis added).
See California Bill Analysis, S.B. 779, available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/9798/bill/sen/sb_0751-0800/sb_779_cfa_19980825_143640_asm_comm.html
45
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obligation to avoid improper meetings or to let anyone know about private meetings (improper or
otherwise) that do occur. This is inconsistent with most other jurisdictions examined in this
analysis.
3. The Rule’s Requirements Are Unclear or Not Well Understood.
In addition to there being problems with the over-permissive culture in which private
conversations are pervasive, some of the current rules appear to be misunderstood. For instance,
even though the CPUC’s ex parte rules clearly prohibit discussions related to judge assignments,
one of the Commissioners claimed he was not aware of the rule and that he would take a
refresher course on the rules. 46 This lack of awareness is not entirely surprising given that ex
parte contacts are currently a regular, every-day occurrence, and due to the fact that decisionmakers have no explicit responsibility to report ex parte contacts.
In addition, even when a party or decision-maker tries to follow the rules, there are some
ambiguities that effect whether all contacts that influence decision-makers are reported. For
instance, Rule 8.2 applies ex parte requirements to “personal advisors.” “Personal” is not
defined in the rules, which makes it unclear who qualifies as a personal advisor. The agency has
typically interpreted this requirement as applying only to advisors that sit in an actual
commissioner office. However, a recent ruling in a proceeding imposing sanctions for violating
ex parte rules requires one utility to “report all communications with any Commission staff
acting in an advisory capacity, including but not limited to the General Counsel, the Executive
Director, Deputy Executive Directors, Division Directors, and advisory staff, regarding any
substantive or procedural issue in an open formal adjudicatory or ratesetting proceeding.” 47
Given that staff members outside of a Commissioner’s office regularly advise decision-makers,
this could be an appropriate ruling to apply more broadly.
Another issue is the distinction between procedural and substantive matters. While the
CPUC’s rules attempt to recognize this difference, the distinction between procedural and
substantive issues can be ambiguous to parties trying to determine whether to contact a decisionmaker, and apparently unclear to decision-makers, as well. For example, one news article
recently quoted a commissioner as suggesting that a message discussing the potential financial
impact on the company of a significant enforcement penalty was not “substantive” because it did
not directly advocate for a specific fine. 48 The communication clearly related to potential action
in a specific docket. The communication must be either procedural or substantive. It is unclear
how one could argue that the communication in question addressed a procedural issue, or that it

46

See PG&E Officials Removed for Improper Communications, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/09/15/us/ap-us-pipelineexplosion.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=WireFeed&module=pocketregion&region=pocket-region&WT.nav=pocket-region.
47
See CPUC Application 13-12-012, October 16, 2014 Ruling of Administrative Law Judge
Yacknin.
48
See California Energy Markets Issue 1294 at p. 6 (August 1, 2014).
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did not go to the substantive outcome of the proceeding. The existing rules offer no clarity in
this regard.
IV.

ELEMENTS OF EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS – COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATION
A. OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS

This analysis of ex parte rules focuses on states and agencies that share similarities with
the CPUC. The federal agency that regulates energy rates, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, was analyzed. Two California agencies that work on technical energy-related
issues – the California Air Resources Board and the California Energy Commission – were also
analyzed. This analysis also evaluates the rules for the utility commissions in the four most
populous states in the country after California – Texas, New York, Illinois and Florida, and a
handful of other states around the country-- Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, and Nevada.
Appendix 2 provides a description of the ex parte requirements for each of these entities. In
addition to analyzing similar entities, the authors also conducted a handful of interviews of
former regulators to understand some regulators’ views of the ex parte practices in their
respective jurisdictions. Summaries of these conversations are included in Appendix 1 and
referenced throughout. The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate the ex parte requirements
for each of the entities and identify potential improvements to the CPUC’s current requirements.
B. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS OF EX PARTE REQUIREMENTS
1. Types of Proceedings Covered – All Contested Proceeding Should Be
Covered
The CPUC’s allowance of ex parte contacts in ratemaking proceedings is inconsistent
with the majority of entities analyzed. For instance, FERC prohibits ex parte communications in
“all contested on-the-record proceedings.” 49 The majority of the states analyzed do not allow ex
parte contacts in contested proceedings, which has been interpreted to include ratemaking
proceedings. 50
One exception to the general rule is New York’s Public Service Commission. New
York’s experience, however, should not be followed in California. Notably, although ex parte
requirements are technically inapplicable to the Public Service Commission, some
commissioners have imposed strict ex parte requirements in their cases. 51 In addition, there
49

18 C.F.R. § 385.2201. Contested on-the-record proceedings is defined as “any proceeding
before the Commission to which there is a right to intervene and in which an intervenor disputes
any material issue, any proceeding initiated pursuant to rule 206 by the filing of a complaint with
the Commission, or any proceeding initiated by the Commission on its own motion or in response
to a filing.” Id. at § 385.2201(c)(1). The coverage of this rule begins when FERC issues an
order that initiates a proceeding, court issues a mandate for remand, a complaint is filed, or an
intervention is filed in which an intervenor disputes a material issue. Id. at § 385.2201(d).
50
See infra Appendix 2.
51
Interview with Peter Bradford, November 3, 2014.
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recently have been recommendations to change New York’s broad allowance of ex parte
contacts. In November 2012, the Governor of New York established a commission called the
Moreland Commission to review the “adequacy of regulatory oversight of the utilities and the
mission of the State’s energy agency and authority functions.” 52 After analyzing the Public
Service Commission’s ex parte rules, the Moreland Commission recommended that the
“[e]xisting statutory exemption of ex parte rules as they relate to the [Public Service
Commission] Commissioners should be eliminated.” 53 The Moreland Commission based this
recommendation on several findings, including the observation that New York’s current broad
allowance of ex parte contacts creates a “disparity in the ability of certain classes of utility
customers to avail themselves of direct access to decision-makers.” 54 The Moreland
Commission further found that ex parte contacts undermine “the indispensable fairness and
unbiased attributes of decision-makers,” and that New York’s broad allowance of contacts is an
anomaly. 55
In addition to the fact that the majority of similar entities do not allow ex parte contacts in
ratemaking proceedings, the courts have similarly found that ratemaking proceedings should be
afforded the protections of a judicial proceeding. While the legislature initially set rates in most
jurisdictions, the states soon recognized that this function was not purely legislative in nature,
and all states established regulatory agencies that function in a “quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial”
manner. This hybrid condition was made more obvious over the years, as legislatures passed
more and more statutory provisions which must be interpreted by regulators as part of the
ratesetting process. Arguably, statutory interpretation includes some characteristics akin to a
judicial function. In 1890, when reviewing ratemaking proceedings related to railroads, the
Supreme Court stated that: “[t]he question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as
regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination.” 56 Courts reviewing ratemaking proceedings
more recently have followed a similar line of reasoning. The Ninth Circuit found that because
Congress required rate decisions under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Conservation Act to
be based on a record after a hearing, APA protections, including the ban on ex parte contacts,
were triggered. 57 The Ninth Circuit has also found that Bonneville Power Administration

52

See NEW YORK MORELAND COMMISSION ON UTILITY STORM PREPARATION AND RESPONSE,
FINAL Report (June 22, 2013), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/documents/MACfinalrepor
tjune22.pdf.
53
See NEW YORK MORELAND COMMISSION ON UTILITY STORM PREPARATION AND RESPONSE,
FINAL REPORT (June 22, 2013), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/documents/MACfinalrepor
tjune22.pdf
54
Id. at 43.
55
Id. at 43. The Moreland Report also cited Massachusetts as broadly allowing ex parte
contacts.
56
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457-58 (1890).
57
See Southern Cal. Edison v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Authority, 770 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ratemaking proceedings are subject to the APA’s prohibition of ex parte communications. 58 This
ban does not extend to discussions between customers with whom the agency was authorized to
enter into rate negotiations. 59 An Arizona court decision similarly found that the commission’s
process for gathering evidence through an evidentiary hearing in the ratemaking process is quasijudicial and therefore subject to ex parte rules. 60
Of the federal and state provisions that were examined for this analysis, a few entities
provide an exception for legislative rulemaking. Specifically, FERC’s ex parte prohibition
applies to all contested on-the-record proceedings except “notice-and-comment rulemakings
under 5 U.S.C. 553, investigations under part 1b of this chapter, proceedings not having a party
or parties, or any proceeding in which no party disputes any material issue.” 61 The California
Administrative Procedure Act only provides an exception for legislative regulatory action, which
is defined as: “the regulatory action, notice of which is submitted to the office for publication in
the California Regulatory Notice Register.” 62
Some of the states analyzed provide a limited exception for legislative rulemaking,
declaratory judgments or other types of uncontested proceedings. Specifically, Connecticut’s
requirements generally apply to all contested cases, including ratemaking, except for the
promulgation of regulations and declaratory judgments. 63 Delaware’s rules apply to “all agency
case decisions except by its utility commission except temporary restraining orders or similar
types of orders.” 64 Illinois’ rules apply to all Commission proceedings. 65 Florida’s requirements
generally apply to all proceedings except legislative rulemakings, declaratory actions, workshops
and internal affairs meetings. 66 Texas’ rules apply to all contested cases, which are defined as:
“[a] proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding, in which the legal rights, duties,
or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an opportunity for
adjudicative hearing.” 67 Virginia’s statute broadly applies to: “any fact or issue arising out of a
proceeding involving the regulation of rates, charges, services or facilities of railroad, telephone,
gas or electric companies.” 68 Nevada’s statute applies to contested cases, which is defined as a
“proceeding, including but not restricted to rate making and licensing, in which the legal rights,
duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an
opportunity for hearing, or in which an administrative penalty may be imposed.” 69

58

Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1984).
Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1984).
60
State ex rel. Corbin v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 13 Ariz. 219 (Ariz. Ct. of Appeals 1984).
61
18 CFR § 385.220.
62
Cal. Gov’t Code § 11342.595.
63
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-166.
64
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10121.
65
220 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/10-103.
66
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 350.042.
67
Texas Administrative Code, Title 16, Part 2, Chapter 22, Subchapter A, Section 22.2(16).
68
Virginia General Statutes § 12.1-30.1 (Meetings and communications between commissioners
and parties or staff).
69
Nevada Administrative Procedure Act, NRS 233B.032.
59
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The key determinants in many jurisdictions are the existence of disagreement among the
participants, the existence of adjudicatory-like features such as evidentiary hearings and the
expectation that the decision-makers will have to review and assess conflicting positions. The
implication is that the right to offer facts and critique opposing points of view in a public,
accountable manner must be protected, and that private substantive communications are in
conflict with this objective. For all of the reasons discussed above, the CPUC should follow the
majority of states, the CEC, CARB, and FERC by prohibiting ex parte contacts in all contested
proceedings, with the possible exception of legislative rulemaking proceedings where no
hearings are held and no individual substantive rights are affected.

2. Types of Communications Covered – There Should Be a Clear
Delineation Between Procedural and Substantive Communications.
As discussed above, CPUC’s rules distinguish between procedural and substantive
matters. The rules specify that: “[c]ommunications regarding the schedule, location, or format for
hearings, filing dates, identity of parties, and other such non-substantive information are
procedural inquiries, not ex parte communications.” 70 However, as discussed above, there can be
issues determining whether something qualifies as an ex parte contact. The difficulty
distinguishing between what matters are truly procedural and what matters are substantive and
contested has been noted in cases. For instance, in a case in Connecticut, the court stated: “[t]he
[agency] attorneys in particular are acutely aware that the boundary line between that which is
procedural and that which is substantive is often unclear, and they act accordingly with
circumspection.”
FERC’s statute provides detailed definitions describing the type of communications
subject to the prohibition. “Off-the-record communication means any communication relevant to
the merits of a contested on-the-record proceeding” without filing and noticing the other
parties. 71 Relevant to the merits is defined as:
capable of affecting the outcome of a proceeding, or of influencing a decision, or
providing an opportunity to influence a decision, on any issue in the proceeding,
but does not include:
(i) Procedural inquiries, such as a request for information relating solely to the
status of a proceeding, unless the inquiry states or implies a preference for a
particular party or position, or is otherwise intended, directly or indirectly, to
address the merits or influence the outcome of a proceeding;
(ii) A general background or broad policy discussion involving an industry or a
substantial segment of an industry, where the discussion occurs outside the
context of any particular proceeding involving a party or parties and does not
address the specific merits of the proceeding; or,

70
71

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 8.1.
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(b).
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(iii) Communications relating to compliance matters not the subject of an ongoing
proceeding. 72
The California Administrative Procedure Act and the Law Revisions Commission
Comments provide more guidance to help distinguish between procedural and substantive matters
than do the CPUC ex parte rules. Section 11430.20 of the California Administrative Procedure
Act provides that the prohibition does not include communications that “concern a matter of
procedure or practice, including a request for a continuance, that is not in controversy.” 73 The
Law Revision Commission Comments provide further description of what this provision is
intended to cover: “This article is not intended to preclude communications made to a presiding
officer or staff assistant regarding noncontroversial matters of procedure and practice, such as the
format of pleadings, number of copies required, manner of service, and calendaring and status
discussions . . . .[s]uch topics are not part of the merits of the matter, provided they appear to be
noncontroversial in context of the specific case.” 74 It would be helpful to include this more
specific clarification and discussion in the CPUC ex parte rules to help minimize issues that may
arise related to distinguishing between procedural and substantive issues.
3. Parties or Members of the Public
CPUC’s requirements apply to “interested persons,” which is a limited subset of entities
that may privately contact CPUC decision-makers. Due to the definition of “interested persons,”
if an agency decides to become a party to a proceeding, it will need to report all contacts whereas
other agencies that are not parties to a proceeding will not report contacts. Other entities have a
broader scope and require other agencies that contact the entity to at least provide notice of the
contact. For example, FERC’s requirements apply to any “person outside the Commission.” 75
FERC’s rules allow ex parte contacts from agencies with regulatory responsibility, but then
require that such contacts are reported. 76 This allows there to be increased transparency related
to outside agency contacts. Other entities also take a stricter approach than the CPUC.
Connecticut’s and Delaware’s requirements apply to any “person” or “party.” 77 Texas’s
requirements apply to communications “in connection with any issue of law or fact with any
agency, person, party, or their representatives.” In other words, Texas’ requirements apply to
anyone making a communication related to law or fact. A majority of the analyzed entities
require a broader approach, similar to that employed by Texas. California should explore
changing CPUC’s requirements to apply more broadly to entities other than interested persons as
currently defined.
4. Treatment of Other Agency Staff - Rules Need to Clearly Define Who Is
a Decision-Maker
As discussed above, there has been some confusion related to which agency staff
members are covered under the rules. FERC’s rules provide a clearer definition:
72

18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(c)(5).
Cal. Gov’t Code § 11430.20.
74
25 Cal. L. Rev. Comm. Reports 55 (1995).
75
See 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201.
76
Id.
77
See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-181; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 29, § 10129.
73
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Decisional employee means a Commissioner or member of his or her personal
staff, an administrative law judge, or any other employee of the Commission, or
contractor, who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process of a proceeding, but does not include an employee designated as part of
the Commission's trial staff in a proceeding, a settlement judge appointed . . . a
neutral (other than an arbitrator) . . . in an alternative dispute resolution
proceeding, or an employee designated as being non-decisional in a proceeding. 78
A similar definition would help to eliminate confusion as to whether a particular advisor
is a “personal” advisor or not under the rules. This rule would also help ensure that parties
would not contact other agency staff as a run-around of the ex parte rules.
5. Discussions Between Decision-makers
It is considered to be antithetical to a fair and open process to allow private deliberations
among decision-makers in a context where ex parte communications are permitted. This can be
seen in the structure of California’s Opening Meeting Act, called Bagley-Keene, which applies
to the CPUC and does not allow more than two CPUC commissioners to discuss a matter in
private unless a ratesetting deliberative meeting is set and ex parte contacts are prohibited for a
prescribed period of time. 79 This interplay between allowing decision-makers to meet and
banning ex parte contacts is seen in other entities that were studied. For example, Connecticut
limits the ability of decision-makers to talk to each other if a decision-maker has received an
improper ex parte contact. 80 Nevada, which bans ex parte communications, provides explicit
permission for members of the agency to meet in private. 81 Broadly for federal regulatory
matters, the Sunshine Act includes an exception from open-meeting requirements for formal
agency adjudications. 82 Commonly, an on-the-record proceeding is considered to be a formal
agency adjudication. Courts have found that the legislative history leading to the Sunshine Act
“makes clear that the exemption should apply only to discussions of adjudication when the
adjudication has taken place on the record and subject to the prohibition of ex parte
communications in the Administrative Procedure Act. These strictures on formal adjudication
work together with the Sunshine Act to achieve full accountability to the public. 83
It should be noted that while New York’s Open Meeting Law does provide a general
exemption for “judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,” this exemption does not currently apply
to public service commission proceedings, which are not subject to an explicit ex parte ban.
Considering the CPUC’s current liberal use of ex parte meetings in a wide variety of
contested proceedings, it is not surprising that the Bagley-Keene Act does not allow for the
commissioners to deliberate privately in more situations. Based on experiences both at the
78

18 C.F.R. § 385.2201.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 54950, et. al.
80
Interestingly, this is from Connecticut’s statutory language. The regulatory language does not
have such a requirement.
81
Nevada Administrative Procedure Act, NRS § 233B.126.
82
5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(10).
83
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 727 F.2d 1195, 1201 (D.C.
Circ. 1983).
79
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federal level and in other states, there is reason to imagine that the Legislature might loosen
Bagley-Keene restrictions as they apply to the CPUC in response to restrictions on ex parte
communications more in line with those affecting other agencies.
6. An Affirmative Duty on Decision-makers Receiving Improper Ex Parte
Contacts
The California Public Utilities Code and the CPUC’s rules do not require decisionmakers to report improper ex parte contacts or to ensure that ex parte contacts are appropriately
filed and noticed. CPUC’s rules are in the minority. Most entities that have ex parte
prohibitions include some type of affirmative requirement on decision-makers. As former
Illinois Commissioner Marty Cohen pointed out, since parties do not want to unduly burden
decision-makers, most parties are careful to not put decision-makers in a position of having to
disclose contact. 84 This, alone, may tend to discourage unnecessary communications.
For example, FERC requires decision-makers to disclose improper ex parte contacts:
Any decisional employee who makes or receives a prohibited off-the-record
communication will promptly submit to the Secretary that communication, if
written, or a summary of the substance of that communication, if oral. The
Secretary will place the communication or the summary in the public file
associated with, but not part of, the decisional record of the proceeding. 85
Former FERC chair Jon Wellinghoff reports that the commissioners take this responsibility very
seriously. They attempt to avoid unlawful contacts. When they occur nonetheless, the practice is
for the effected decision-maker to file a report promptly. 86
The California APA, followed by CARB and the CEC, also requires a decision-maker to
“disclose the content of the communication on the record and give all parties an opportunity to
address it.” 87 Section 11430.50 further specifies that the presiding officer “shall make” the
improper communication part of the record, notify all the parties of the communication, and
allow parties an opportunity to address it. 88 Illinois, Texas and Florida similarly require
decision-makers to report ex parte contacts. For example, Texas requires that records must be
kept of all such communications and made available to the public on a monthly basis. The
records of communications must contain the following information:
(A) name and address of the person contacting the commission;
(B) name and address of the party or business entity represented;
(C) case, proceeding, or application, if available;
(D) subject matter of communication;
(E) the date of the communication;
(F) the action, if any, requested of the commission; and
84

See Appendix 1, Summary of Conversation with Marty Cohen.
18 C.F.R. § 385.2211(f).
86
See Appendix 1, Summary of Conversation with Jon Wellinghoff, October 16, 2014.
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Cal. Gov’t Code § 11430.40.
88
Cal. Gov’t Code § 11430.50.
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(G) whether the person has received, or expects to receive, a financial benefit in
return for making the communication.
Texas also requires the commission to establish rules governing communications. The Texas
Commission’s own rules state that members of the commission or administrative law judges
assigned to render a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested
case may not communicate, directly or indirectly with anyone except commission advisory staff
about the case. The onus is placed squarely on the decision makers.
It is unusual that an agency such as the CPUC would put the reporting burden on the
parties, rather than on the decision-maker. In this case, however, the CPUC created rules
consistent with the underlying statute. It would require a change in the law to relieve parties of
the responsibility to file reports. However, the CPUC could go beyond existing law and
establish a procedure where its decision-makers would file reports as well. This could be done
without new legislation.
7. Remedies for Improper Ex Parte Contact
In Florida, if a commissioner knowingly fails to put an ex parte communication on the
record, the commissioner could be fined. 89 One case, a commissioner was fined $5000 for failing
to put an improper ex parte contact on the record. 90 In general, most jurisdictions apply a
balancing test to determine the remedy for an improper ex parte contact. Florida’s approach is
worth exploring because it has been applied when a commissioner violates an affirmative duty to
report improper ex parte contacts. However, an examination of other jurisdiction uncovered no
precisely-defined remedies, beyond general provisions in various states for penalties in the event
of the violation of orders or rules by utilities or other parties.
Most logically, the existence of clear and predictable remedies in the face of an ex parte
rule violation by an outside party or a decision-maker should provide an incentive for all
involved to comply with the rules. The CPUC has already struggled with the appropriate and
effective way to penalize a multi-billion dollar corporation for such rule violations. This may be
a worthy topic for further consideration by the legislature.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Most California agencies, key federal agencies, and utility regulators in most other states
recognize the importance of avoiding ex parte communications in contested matters. In most
situations, the CPUC does not. Where prohibitions on such private communications are stronger
than those before the CPUC, regulators report no impairment in their ability to decide matters
knowledgeably and efficiently. In all other jurisdictions studied for this report where ex parte
prohibitions exist, the primary responsibility rests with the decision-maker to avoid such
contacts. The rules at the CPUC place no responsibility on the decision-makers, beyond
requiring that they grant equal-time meetings in some circumstances. Where other agencies
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Fla. Stat. Ann. § 350.042
See In re Rudolph Bradley, 2007 WL 1697092 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings June 11, 2007).
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require reporting of ex parte contacts, it is the decision-makers who must make the report. Not so
at the CPUC.
It is not difficult to see how these circumstances can lead to communications in contested
matters that would violate some concepts of ethical behavior, to violations of the prohibitions
that do exist at the CPUC, and to unreported communications. When it comes to governing their
own communications with public officials, many advocates will take their lead from the public
officials themselves. If the official does not put a stop to improper contacts, then why stop? If the
public official does not express a concern about the need to file reports on ex parte
communications, why report? For these reasons, the highest priority of any ex parte reform at the
CPUC should be the following:
1. Broaden the list of prohibited communications to make it more consistent with the
approach used by other agencies. – a ban on ex parte communications in contested
matters, while allowing for properly noticed meetings where all parties are invited.
2. Phrase the prohibition as it applies to other agencies – prohibit the decision-makers
from participating in improper communications.
3. Place the reporting responsibility where it applies in most other agencies – the
responsibility to report ex parte communications should rest with the decisionmakers.
Beyond these principles, there are several other modifications that promise to clarify
responsibilities and contribute to more effective and transparent process:
1. More clearly define the distinction between substantive communications, which
would be subject to limitations, and procedural communications, which would not.
This might be done most effectively by creating a discrete list of communications
which would be considered to be procedural.
2. Broaden the restrictions to apply to communications with any outside person, not just
formal parties and their agents.
3. To avoid having various advisory staff serve as messengers between interested parties
and those current designated as decision-makers, broaden the definition to decisionmakers to include all of those staff members who are working with commissioners or
their in-office advisors to help shape the ultimate result.
4. Clearly define the consequences of a decision-makers failure to prohibit avoidable ex
parte communications or to report on those that do occur.
Most of these changes could be enacted by the CPUC without benefit of new legislation.
Where current law does not require certain behavior by decision-makers, the CPUC could likely
take on additional responsibilities without a change in the statute. Others may require changes to
the law. The CPUC can take the lead in seeking such changes.
Finally, ex parte reforms may be the key to better decision-making at the agency. With
proper limitations on ex parte communications, the CPUC would be in a much stronger position
to seek modifications to open meetings laws to facilitate more effective deliberations among the
commissioners.
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Appendix 1 – Experience by Previous Decision-makers related to Ex Parte Rules
Discussion with Jon Wellinghoff, October 16, 2014
Mr. Wellinghoff most recently served as the Chair of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, where he functioned within the boundaries of a rule that banned ex parte
communications in contested proceedings. He found that this rule did not interfere with his
ability to make fully informed decisions. Mr. Wellinghoff and his staff could rely on all of the
pleadings and anything in the formal record. Commissioners could meet to discuss pending
matters as long as a quorum (three of the five commissioners) was not present. In addition, the
commissioners’ advisory staff met frequently to discuss pending cases with each other and with
the staff responsible for writing draft orders. As a result, decisions were complete and ready for a
vote by the time the Commission considered them in a public meeting. The onus was on the
commissioners and other decision-makers to report on any ex parte communications, whether or
not the outside person represented a formal party to the proceeding in question. For instance, if a
U.S. senator called a commissioner to express interest in a pending proceeding, the
commissioner would inform the senator that the communication was an ex parte communication
and that he or she would file a report on the conversation with the FERC General Counsel and
include the report in the record in the proceeding.
Any entity planning to file an application, complaint, or make any other formal request might
contact a decision-maker prior to making a formal filing in order to discuss the matter. This, in
some circumstances, may have created the potential for an inequitable situation, in that other
effected parties may have no notice of the meeting or impending filing and therefore may not be
able to anticipate and respond to points made by the filing party. However, these
communications preceded both the development of the formal record and the time for internal
deliberations. Also, there was no certainty that the proposed filing would in fact be made. Mr.
Wellinghoff found these early communications to generally be useful, but to have little impact
on the outcome of the proceeding. On balance, he felt that the benefits of the ex parte ban far
outweighed any inequities related to the pre-filing communications.
Discussion with Peter Bradford, November 3, 2014
Mr. Bradford has been a decision-maker for three entities: the New York Public Service
Commission, the Maine Public Utilities Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. In his over twenty years of experience, he has been able to make his decisions
without ex parte communications. He commented that Maine and the NRC had similar ex parte
rules, which prohibited ex parte contacts in adjudicatory proceedings.
In New York, although ex parte contacts were broadly allowed, each commissioner was allowed
to apply their own rules. He used what he did in Maine and the NRC and prohibited ex parte
contacts. (During his tenure in New York, several of the commissioners had a policy of no ex
parte contacts.) There were several reasons why he did this. He did not want to spend the time
to have the meetings because he would then have had to have similar meetings with most of the
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other parties and he did not think he would gain much from ex parte meetings. He does not
believe that he was put at a disadvantage by not having meetings, and it did not impair his ability
to understand the cases. He noted that nothing prevented commissioners from communicating
with administrative law judges to assure that a full record was developed on any issue of interest.
He noted that regulatory agencies do not have operational responsibilities and can therefore take
the time to get the facts that they need through adjudicatory processes. Exemption processes can
be crafted to deal with the rare emergency situations in which formal procedures take too long.
Mr. Bradford further noted how the court system functions with prohibitions on ex parte
contacts, and that he sees no reason why regulatory agencies cannot do the same. He also
commented that there is no reason to believe that the many states with rigorous ex parte
requirements have not made good decisions. One tool that he found effective in New York was
relying on panels in which all the parties were invited to present.
Discussion with Marty Cohen, November 3, 2014
For three decades Mr. Cohen has worked as an advocate and expert witness before the Illinois
Commerce Commission, and briefly served as its Chairman. Illinois affirmatively requires
decision-makers, including commissioners and their assistants, to report improper ex parte
communications. Mr. Cohen noted that due to this affirmative duty, parties are careful to not put
a commissioner in a situation where they have to report a communication. He also described that
parties and commissioners are very cautious now in Illinois because there were problems around
a decade ago when there was a perceived coziness of some commissioners with the utilities,
although an investigation by the state Attorney General’s office did not result in any action.
Under the Illinois Open Meeting Act, the five commissioners can only meet privately in groups
of no greater than two, but nothing prevents commissioners from meeting in series. He
described how one way parties work around the ex parte rule is that they preview cases to
commissioners before they file, provided there are no pending cases addressing the same
issues. This is a common practice.
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APPENDIX 2 - SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES AND AGENCIES DISCUSSED IN
COMPARISON
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

FERC
California APA
CARB
CEC
Connecticut
Delaware
Illinois
Texas
Virginia
Nevada
New York
Florida

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
The purpose of FERC’s ex parte prohibition is to permit “fully informed decision making
by the Commission while ensuring the integrity and fairness of the Commission's decisional
process.” 91 FERC prohibits ex parte communications in “all contested on-the-record
proceedings.” 92 FERC exempts communications in “notice-and-comment rulemakings under 5
U.S.C. Section 553 investigations under part 1b of this chapter, or any proceeding in which no
party disputes any material issue” from this requirement. 93
The statute specifies that unless expressly permitted, “in any contested on-the-record
proceeding, no person outside the commission shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any
decisional employee, and no decisional employee 94 shall make or knowingly cause to be made to
any person outside the Commission, any off-the-record communication.” 95
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18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(a).
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201. Contested on-the-record proceedings is defined as “any proceeding
before the Commission to which there is a right to intervene and in which an intervenor disputes
any material issue, any proceeding initiated pursuant to rule 206 by the filing of a complaint with
the Commission, or any proceeding initiated by the Commission on its own motion or in response
to a filing.” Id. at § 385.2201(c)(1). The coverage of this rule begins when FERC issues an
order that initiates a proceeding, court issues a mandate for remand, a complaint is filed, or an
intervention is filed in which an intervenor disputes a material issue. Id. at § 385.2201(d).
93
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(c)(1)(ii).
94
“Decisional employee means a Commissioner or member of his or her personal staff, an
administrative law judge, or any other employee of the Commission, or contractor, who is or may
reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of a proceeding, but does not
include an employee designated as part of the Commission's trial staff in a proceeding, a
settlement judge . . ., a neutral (other than an arbitrator) . . . in an alternative dispute resolution
92
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The statute provides detailed definitions describing the type of communications subject to
the prohibition. “Off-the-record communication means any communication relevant to the
merits of a contested on-the-record proceeding” without filing and noticing the other parties. 96
Relevant to the merits is defined as:
capable of affecting the outcome of a proceeding, or of influencing a decision, or
providing an opportunity to influence a decision, on any issue in the proceeding,
but does not include:
(i) Procedural inquiries, such as a request for information relating solely to the
status of a proceeding, unless the inquiry states or implies a preference for a
particular party or position, or is otherwise intended, directly or indirectly, to
address the merits or influence the outcome of a proceeding;
(ii) A general background or broad policy discussion involving an industry or a
substantial segment of an industry, where the discussion occurs outside the
context of any particular proceeding involving a party or parties and does not
address the specific merits of the proceeding; or,
(iii) Communications relating to compliance matters not the subject of an ongoing
proceeding. 97
Contested on-the-record proceeding is defined in the regulations to mean:
(i) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, any proceeding
before the Commission to which there is a right to intervene and in which an
intervenor disputes any material issue, any proceeding initiated pursuant to rule
206 by the filing of a complaint with the Commission, any proceeding initiated by
the Commission on its own motion or in response to a filing, or any proceeding
arising from an investigation under part 1b of this chapter beginning from the
time the Commission initiates a proceeding governed by part 385 of this chapter.
(ii) The term does not include notice-and-comment rulemakings under 5 U.S.C.
553, investigations under part 1b of this chapter, proceedings not having a party
or parties, or any proceeding in which no party disputes any material issue. 98
The prohibition applies from the time of the order or a complaint is filed initiating the proceeding
until a final decision in the proceeding. 99 The rules further exempt communications from a
“non-party elected official” and “a Federal, state, local or Tribal agency” that has regulatory
responsibilities and is not a party to the proceeding if notice is provided to the other parties. 100
Interestingly, the ex parte prohibition does not apply to a communication from “an interceder
who is a local, State, or Federal agency which has no official interest in and whose official duties
proceeding, or an employee designated as being non-decisional in a proceeding.” Id. at §
385.2201(d).
95
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(b).
96
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(b).
97
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(c)(5).
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18 C.F.R. § 385.220.
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18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(d).
100
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(e).
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are not affected by the outcome of the on-the-record proceedings before the Commission to
which the communication relates....” 101 An “interceder” is defined by § 385.2201(a) as “any
individual outside the Commission, whether in private or public life, partnership, corporation,
association or other agency, other than a party or an agent of a party, who volunteers a
communication.”
In the event an improper ex parte communication is made, FERC requires its disclosure,
prohibits its consideration, and allows parties to file comments responding to the
communication. 102 The rules also allow for sanctions if a party knowingly makes a prohibited
communication. 103 The D.C. Circuit has found that: “[e]ven if FERC receives an ex parte
communication that violates 18 C.F.R. § 385.2201, the court will not undo FERC's action unless
“‘the agency's decisionmaking process was irrevocably tainted so as to make the ultimate
judgment of the agency unfair.’ ” 104
CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
California’s Government Code contains general provisions that prohibit ex parte
communications during pending agency adjudicatory proceedings. Many California agencies,
including the California Air Resources Board and the California Energy Commission, are subject
to these requirements. Section 11430.10 of the Government Code provides that:
[w]hile the proceeding is pending there shall be no communication, direct or
indirect, regarding any issue in the proceeding, to the presiding officer from an
employee or representative of an agency that is a party or from an interested
person outside the agency, without notice and opportunity for all parties to
participate in the communication. 105
This section defines a proceeding as “pending” as starting from “the issuance of the
agency's pleading, or from an application for an agency decision, whichever is earlier.” 106 This
section was added in 1995 through Senate Bill 523 from former Section 11513.5(a) and (b). As
related to “interested person outside the agency,” the Law Revision Commission Comments state
that it “replaces the former reference to a “person who has a direct or indirect interest in the
outcome of the proceeding,” and is drawn from federal law.” 107 These provisions apply to a
hearing officer or whoever the decision-maker is. 108 The provisions further provide that the
presiding officer can generally speak with other agency personnel that are not parties, but that the
101

18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(b)(1).
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(f).
103
18 C.F.R. § 385.2201(i).
104
Lichoulas v. F.E.R.C., 606 F.3d 769, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Press Broad. Co. v. FCC, 59
F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C.Cir.1995)).
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Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.10.
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Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.10(c).
107
25 Cal.L.Rev.Comm. Reports 711 (1995) (citing federal APA and a case that interprets the
language as applying to anyone who has an interest beyond the general public).
108
See Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.20 (provisions apply to agency head or other person
delegated to make decision).
102
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officer cannot speak with the agency head. 109 Strangely, although this prohibition applies to
communications to the presiding officer, the law’s comments note that “it does not preclude the
presiding officer from communicating with an adversary.” 110
Section 11430.20 provides that the prohibition does not include communications that
“concern a matter of procedure or practice, including a request for a continuance, that is not in
controversy.” 111 The Law Revision Commission Comments provide further description of what
this provision is intended to cover: “This article is not intended to preclude communications
made to a presiding officer or staff assistant regarding noncontroversial matters of procedure and
practice, such as the format of pleadings, number of copies required, manner of service, and
calendaring and status discussions. Subdivision (b). Such topics are not part of the merits of the
matter, provided they appear to be noncontroversial in context of the specific case.” 112
Section 11430.30 defines the agency employees that may communicate with a decisionmaker. In general, as long as a person has not served as an “investigator, prosecutor, or advocate
in the proceeding or its preadjudicative stage” the person may give advice related to a
proceeding. 113 The Section also provides that: “[a]n assistant or advisor may evaluate the
evidence in the record but shall not furnish, augment, diminish, or modify the evidence in the
record.” 114 The Section also allows someone who has served as an investigator, prosecutor or
advocate to discuss a settlement with a hearing officer. The Section further allows “advice [that]
involves a technical issue in the proceeding and the advice is necessary for, and is not otherwise
reasonably available to, the presiding officer, provided the content of the advice is disclosed on
the record and all parties are given an opportunity to address it.” 115 This exception only applies
to adjudicative proceedings that are “nonprosecutorial in character.” 116 The Comments to the
Revision describe the purpose of this exception as follows:
Subdivision (c) applies to non-prosecutorial types of administrative adjudications,
such as power plant siting, land use decisions, and proceedings allocating water or
setting water quality protection or in-stream flow requirements. The provision
recognizes that the length and complexity of many cases of this type may as a
practical matter make it impossible for an agency to adhere to the restrictions of
this article, given limited staffing and personnel. Subdivision (c)(1) recognizes
that such an adjudication may require advice from a person with special technical
knowledge whose advice would not otherwise be available to the presiding officer
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Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.80.
25 Cal.L.Rev.Comm. Reports 711 (1995). The comments also note how this reverses former
Section 11513.5.
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Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.20.
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25 Cal.L.Rev.Comm. Reports 55 (1995).
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under standard doctrine. Subdivision (c)(2) recognizes the need for policy advice
from planning staff in proceedings such as land use and environmental matters. 117
If a decision-maker receives an improper ex parte communication, Section 11430.40
requires a decision-maker to “disclose the content of the communication on the record and give
all parties an opportunity to address it.” 118 Section 11430.50 further specifies that the presiding
officer “shall make” the improper communication part of the record, notify all the parties of the
communication, and allow parties an opportunity to address it. 119 Another provision limits
communications between the presiding officer and agency head unless the presiding officer does
not issue a decision in the proceeding. 120
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD
The California Air Resource Board is governed by the California Administrative
Procedure Act, which is described above. Its regulations thus prohibit:
while the proceeding is pending, the hearing officer shall not participate in any
communications with any party, representative of a party, or any person who has
a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the proceeding about the subject
matter or merits of the case at issue, without notice and opportunity of all parties,
to participate in communication. 121
The rules define pending as “from the time that the petition for review of an executive
officer decision is filed.” The rules exempt “matters of procedure and practice, including
requests for continuances that are not in controversy” and communications when the opposing
party is in default. 122 The rules also allow for the hearing office to be assisted by other agency
employees that are not an investigator, prosecutor or advocate in the proceeding. 123 The rules
require that improper communications should be disclosed on the record, and all parties should
be given an opportunity to address it. 124 The rules further describe how the ex parte rules apply
to the state board. As the rules provide, communications with the state board are generally
prohibited, and the state board may communicate with staff of the state board if parties are
“provided reasonable notice and opportunity to participate in such communications.” 125
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION
The California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
(California Energy Commission) applies the California APA’s ex parte prohibition to its
adjudicatory proceedings. The relevant rules define “presiding officer” as “all commissioners
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25 Cal.L.Rev.Comm. Reports 711 (1995)
Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.40.
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Cal. Gov’t Code Section 11430.50.
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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 60055.13
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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 60055.13(d).
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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 60055.13(e).
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and all hearing officers.” 126 The rules further require that “[a]n adviser to a commissioner or any
other member of a commissioner's own staff shall not be used in any manner that would
circumvent the purposes and intent of this section.” 127
CONNECTICUT
In 1971, Connecticut enacted a statute that prohibits ex parte communications between
agency decision-makers and members of the public for issues of fact and decision-makers and
parties for issues of law. 128 The current relevant statutory language provides that:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, no
hearing officer or member of an agency who, in a contested case, is to render a
final decision or to make a proposed final decision shall communicate, directly or
indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with any person or party, or, in
connection with any issue of law, with any party or the party's representative,
without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. 129
Contested case is defined as:
“Contested case” means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making,
price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party
are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an
opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held, but does not include
proceedings on a petition for a declaratory ruling under section 4-176, hearings
referred to in section 4-168 or hearings conducted by the Department of
Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles; 130
Section 168 referenced in the statute applies to the promulgation of regulations, and
section 4-176 applies to declaratory rulings. The statute has a parallel provision that provides
that: “no party or intervenor in a contested case, no other agency, and no person who has a direct
or indirect interest in the outcome of the case” shall communicate about “any issue in that case”
with “a hearing officer or any member of the agency, or with any employee or agent of the
agency assigned to assist the hearing officer or members of the agency in such case” without
opportunity for all parties to participate. 131 Thus, the statute makes it clear that the ex parte
protections extend to agency personnel who are assisting decision-makers and to persons who
have a direct or indirect interest. The statute further states that members of an agency may
consult with each other:
a member of a multimember agency may communicate with other members of the
agency regarding a matter pending before the agency, and members of the agency
or a hearing officer may receive the aid and advice of members, employees, or
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Cal. Code Regs. tit. 20, § 1216.
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See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-181.
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agents of the agency if those members, employees, or agents have not received
communications prohibited by subsection (a) of this section. 132
Interestingly, the statute provides an exception to the ability of interagency communications if
the decision-maker received improper ex parte communications. 133 These statutory ex parte
provisions provide that the agency may decide when a case has commenced, but it must be no
later than the date of the hearing. 134
Connecticut’s Public Utilities Regulations provide similar language as the statute and
prohibits ex parte communications in a contested case without notice and opportunity for all
parties to participate. 135 The regulations provide an exception for “routine communications”:
This rule shall not be construed to preclude such necessary routine communications as
are necessary to permit the commission staff to investigate facts and to audit the
applicable records of any party in a contested case at any time before, during and after the
hearing thereof. 136
The applicable regulatory definition of “commence” for triggering the ex parte provisions is the
date of service of the initial notice of the hearing thereof. 137 Similar to the statute, the
regulations explicitly allow commissioners and commission staff to communicate with each
other. 138 The regulations, however, do not include the provision stating that the decision-makers
cannot talk to other decision-makers that are tainted by improper ex parte contacts.
Connecticut state law has long “held that a fundamental requirement of a fair
administrative hearing is that ‘the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience to
consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach his conclusion uninfluenced by
extraneous considerations.” 139 Accordingly, “[e]ven in the absence of such a statute [prohibiting
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Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-181(b).
Id.
134
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-181(d).
135
Connecticut Public Utilities Regulations § 16-1-28, available at
http://www.ct.gov/pura/lib/pura/regs/16-1-1to345-9_title_16_comprehensive.pdf. The rules
apply when the case is commenced, which is on the date of service of the initial notice of the
hearing. Id. at 16-1-27. Contested case is defined in section 4-166(2) of the Connecticut General
Statutes. Connecticut Public Utilities Regulations § 16-1-2. Contested case is defined as “a
proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which the
legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held . . .
.” Id.
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Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-28.
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Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-27.
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Connecticut Public Utilities Regulations § 16-1-28.
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United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936).
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ex parte communications], therefore, an ex parte communication by an adjudicator concerning a
case before him would indicate that the decision had been made upon unlawful procedure.” 140
A Connecticut court has reversed and remanded a decision when an improper ex parte
contact occurred. For example, in Lapia v. Stratford, the Connecticut Court of Appeals reversed
an award of attorney’s fees because the commissioner that issued the award had an improper ex
parte contact with the attorney. 141
Several cases have examined what constitutes a communication for purposes of ex parte
contacts and have found that agency reports and investigations do not constitute a
“communication” under the statute. 142 An opinion by the Connecticut Department of Public
Utility Control (Department) suggests that the Department strictly maintains the prohibition on
ex parte contacts related to substantive issues. 143 A city filed a motion for recusal after the
hearing officer discussed a scheduling issue with the petitioner. The Department found that the
communication qualified as a routine procedural matter, and therefore was not an improper ex
parte contact. In its opinion, the Department described how its structure facilitated making
proper decisions related to the distinction between procedural and substantive:
The Department is constantly vigilant to ensure that the integrity and fairness of
its proceedings are not compromised in any manner. To this end, case
coordinators are employed at the agency to function in a similar manner as clerks
of the court - persons who are equipped to facilitate the progress of complex,
multi-party proceedings by administering the procedural aspects of all cases. On
occasion, the case coordinators may be assisted in their duties by the Department's
attorneys or other staff persons. The attorneys in particular are acutely aware that
the boundary line between that which is procedural and that which is substantive
is often unclear, and they act accordingly with circumspection. 144
Although not explicitly related to public utility commissions, a Connecticut Worker’s
Compensation Treatise states that “[t]he commission’s general policy of open communications
between the parties has resulted in a practice of little, if any, ex parte communication with the
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See, e.g., Menillo v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 47 Conn. App. 325
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England Rehabilitation Hosp. of Hartford v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, 226
Conn. 105 (1993) (finding that including a report by Commission on Hospitals and Health Care
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See Connecticut Dept. of Public Utility Control, Decision 97-07-10, 1997 WL 33806520
(Conn. D.P.U.C.).
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commissioners regarding the informal or formal hearing.” 145 The treatise further emphasizes
that “[t]he commissioners themselves function under a Code of Ethics which stresses the
improper nature of ex parte communications except in relation to purely procedural matters of
scheduling or in relation to settlement negotiations.” 146
DELAWARE
In 1976, Delaware enacted a statute prohibiting ex parte contacts in agency decisions.
The relevant statutory text provides:
No member or employee of an agency assigned to participate in any way in the
rendering of a case decision shall discuss or communicate, directly or indirectly,
respecting any issue of fact or law with any person or party, except upon notice to
and opportunity for all parties to participate. This section shall not apply to
communications required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law
or to communications by and among members of an agency, the agency's staff
and the agency's attorney. 147
The statute defines “case decision” as:
any agency proceeding or determination that a named party as a matter of past or
present fact, or of threatened or contemplated private action, is or is not in
violation of a law or regulation, or is or is not in compliance with any existing
requirement for obtaining a license or other right or benefit. Such administrative
adjudications include, without limitation, those of a declaratory nature respecting
the payment of money or resulting in injunctive relief requiring a named party to
act or refrain from acting or threatening to act in some way required or forbidden
by law or regulation under which the agency is operating. 148
Delaware’s requirements apply to all contested proceedings except for “(1) Decisions
relating to the assessment of taxes or tax penalties made by the Tax Appeals Board; or (2)
Temporary restraining orders and similar orders authorized by law to be issued summarily.” 149
Delaware’s regulations applicable to its Public Service Commission provide a blanket
rule that is nearly identical to the statutory language providing that Commissioners and
Commission staff deciding a case cannot “discuss or communicate directly or indirectly,
respecting any issue of fact or law with any party or person expect upon notice to, and
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opportunity for, all parties to participate.” 150 Delaware’s rules apply once the proceeding has
moved to the decision-making phase. 151 The rule states:
No Commissioner or Commission Staff assigned to participate in any way in the
rendering of a case decision shall discuss or communicate, directly or indirectly,
respecting any issue of fact or law with any party or person except upon notice to, and
opportunity for, all parties to participate. This rule shall not apply to communications
required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, or to
communications, not prohibited by law, by and among Commission members and
Commission Staff. 152
Cases interpreting the statute have found the purpose of the law is to “insure impartiality”
of the agency rendering a decision, and therefore, communications which occur after the decision
are not prohibited. 153 Another case interpreted the statute as not applying to scheduling
matters. 154
To notify the public and parties of improper ex parte communications, the Delaware
Public Service Commission posts them on its website for 30 days and sends a notification to all
parties of record in the proceeding. 155 The explanation of the website states that:
Ex Parte Communications are any oral or written communications with a
Commissioner or Commission Staff member that addresses the merits of an
adjudicatory proceeding on which the Commissioner or Staff member must render
a decision and that was neither on the record nor on reasonable prior notice to all
the parties. Such communications with Commissioners and Commission Staff are
inappropriate between the time of the initial application filing and the rendering of
a final decision on the case. When the Commissioners or Staff members receive
such communications, they will be posted on the website for 30 days with
notification sent to all parties of record on the proceeding. 156
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Thus, the Public Service Commission at least appears to affirmatively require that
commissioners or commission staff post improper communications that they receive. On
October 15, 2014, three contacts were posted: (1) an email from the Commission Director
discussing a potential settlement related to a merger; (2) a letter from the Delaware State
Chamber of Commerce related to the same merger; and (3) a letter from an individual related to
the same merger. 157 The website description of the ex parte rules states that it applies to
adjudicatory proceeding even though that is not defined in the PSC’s regulations. 158
ILLINOIS
In the mid-1980’s, Illinois promulgated a statute prohibiting ex parte contacts at its
Commerce Commission unless other parties could participate. The statute applies broadly to
“Commission proceedings, including ratemaking proceedings,” and it applies to “[a]ny
commissioner, hearing examiner, or other person who is or may reasonably be expected to be
involved in the decisional process of the proceeding.” 159 The statute places an affirmative duty
on the agency decision-maker to place improper ex parte communications on the record.
§ 10-103. In all proceedings, investigations or hearings conducted by the
Commission, except in the disposition of matters which the Commission is
authorized to entertain or dispose of on an ex parte basis, any finding, decision or
order made by the Commission shall be based exclusively on the record for
decision in the case, which shall include only the transcript of testimony and
exhibits together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, including, in
contested cases. . . . . The provisions of Section 10-60 of the Illinois
Administrative Procedure Act shall apply in full to Commission proceedings,
including ratemaking cases, any provision of the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act to the contrary notwithstanding.
The provisions of Section 10-60 shall not apply, however, to communications
between Commission employees who are engaged in investigatory, prosecutorial
or advocacy functions and other parties to the proceeding, provided that such
Commission employees are still prohibited from communicating on an ex parte
basis, as designated in Section 10-60, directly or indirectly, with members of the
Commission, any hearing examiner in the proceeding, or any Commission
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional
process of the proceeding. Any commissioner, hearing examiner, or other person
who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of
a proceeding, who receives, or who makes or knowingly causes to be made, a
communication prohibited by this Section or Section 10-60 of the Illinois
Administrative Procedure Act as modified by this Section, shall place on the
public record of the proceeding (1) any and all such written communications; (2)
memoranda stating the substance of any and all such oral communications; and
157
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(3) any and all written responses and memoranda stating the substance of any and
all oral responses to the materials described in clauses (1) and (2).
The Commission, or any commissioner or hearing examiner presiding over the
proceeding, shall in the event of a violation of this Section, take whatever action
is necessary to ensure that such violation does not prejudice any party or
adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings, including dismissing the affected
matter. 160
The Illinois Commerce Commission’s Rules of Practice provides parallel, more specific
regulatory requirements. The Rules prohibit direct or indirect ex parte communications between
parties and commissioners, commission employees and hearing examiners related to a contested
case or licensing proceeding without the opportunity for all parties to participate. 161 Illinois’
rules specify that communications between a commissioner and other commissioners, hearing
examiner, or personal assistants are not prohibited. 162 As the statute requires, the rules state that
if an ex parte communication is made, the commissioner, hearing examiner or other commission
employee who received or made the communication has to place the written communication or a
memoranda stating the substance of the oral communication on the record. 163
The rules specifically provide:
a) Unless waived by written stipulation of the parties in the proceeding as provided by
Section 10-70 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act [5 ILCS 100/10-70], once
notice of hearing has been given in a contested case or licensing proceeding,
Commissioners, Commission employees and Hearing Examiners shall not communicate
directly or indirectly with:
1) Any party to the proceeding on any issue in the proceeding; or
2) A party's representative on any issue in the proceeding; or
3) Any other person concerning an issue of fact in the proceeding;
without notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
b) The following communications are not subject to subsection (a) of this Section:
1) Communications between Commission employees who are engaged in investigatory,
prosecutorial or advocacy functions and other parties to the proceeding, provided that
such Commission employees are still prohibited from communicating on an ex parte
basis, as designated in subsection (a), directly or indirectly, with members of the
Commission, any Hearing Examiner in the proceeding, or any Commission employee
who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the
proceeding (this language derived from Section 10-103 of the Public Utilities Act [220
ILCS 5/10-103] and applies only to proceedings under that Act);
2) Communications between a Commissioner and other Commissioners, and between a
Commissioner or hearing examiner and one or more personal assistants. [5 ILCS 100/1060]
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c) Any Commissioner, Hearing Examiner, or other Commission employee who is or may
reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of a proceeding, who
receives, or who makes or knowingly causes to be made, a communication prohibited by
Section 10-60 of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act as modified by Section 10-103
of the Public Utilities Act [220 ILCS 5/10-103] shall place on the public record of the
proceeding:
1) All such written communications;
2) Memoranda stating the substance of all such oral communications; and
3) All written responses and memoranda stating the substance of all oral responses to the
materials described in subsections (c)(1) and (2). [220 ILCS 5/10-103]
d) The material specified in subsection (c) shall be disclosed to the parties of record by:
1) service on the parties at the next hearing; or
2) if no hearing is scheduled within the next seven days, service by mail on all parties of
record. 164
Only a few cases have substantively interpreted Illinois’ ex parte requirements as applied
to the Commerce Commission. One case, which has been cited by other cases and agency
briefing, compared the prohibition of ex parte contacts in the agency context to the judicial
context:
In interpreting the Supreme Court rules on judicial conduct, one court has held
that the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to the public
confidence as actual bias or prejudice. (People v. Bradshaw (1988), 171
Ill.App.3d 971, 976, 121 Ill.Dec. 791, 525 N.E.2d 1098.) Inherent in the rules is
the concept that a judge who has a personal interest in a case cannot act fairly in
that case. The principle of jurisprudence that one with a personal interest in the
subject matter of decision in a case may not act as judge in that case is applicable
not just to judges but to administrative agents, commissioners, referees, masters in
chancery, or other arbiters of questions of law or fact not holding judicial office.
(In re Heirich (1956), 10 Ill.2d 357, 384, 140 N.E.2d 825.) A duty to recuse
oneself has been applied to an arbiter of facts or law in an adversary proceeding
who had a financial interest in the subject matter. Heirich, 10 Ill.2d at 385, 140
N.E.2d 825. On the basis that defendant was a commissioner whose duties were
similar to those of a judge, we hold that the judicial conduct principles applied to
him resulting in a duty to recuse himself when his impartiality was reasonably
questioned. We also hold that plaintiffs' complaint stated a cause of action
because it sufficiently alleged the appearance of impropriety by defendant, who as
a commissioner, was required to avoid such an appearance and was statutorily
prohibited from making ex parte communications. 165
Another case found that ex parte communications should not be considered part of the record
because that would eviscerate the purpose of the prohibition:
164
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[M]ere disclosure of an ex parte communication does not transform such material
into competent evidence before an administrative tribunal. To hold otherwise
would be tantamount to a wholesale evisceration of the provisions requiring
adherence to the rules of evidence for the circuit courts and that findings of fact
be based upon evidence in the record. When ascertaining the meaning of a statute,
it should be read as a whole with all relevant parts considered, and it should be
construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless. 166
TEXAS
Texas requires that records are kept of all communications between the commission and
its employees and public utilities and any person. 167 Texas prohibits ex parte communications
related to a contested case. 168 Section 14.153 of the Public Utilities Regulatory Act provides:
(a) The regulatory authority shall adopt rules governing communications with the regulatory
authority or a member or employee of the regulatory authority by: (1) a public utility; (2) an
affiliate; or (3) a representative of a public utility or affiliate.
(b) A record of a communication must contain: (1) the name of the person contacting the
regulatory authority or member or employee of the regulatory authority; (2) the name of the
business entity represented; (3) a brief description of the subject matter of the
communication; and (4) the action, if any, requested by the public utility, affiliate, or
representative.
(c) Records compiled under Subsection (b) shall be available to the public monthly.
The applicable regulations provide:
(2) Ex parte communications. Unless required for the disposition of ex parte
matters authorized by law, members of the commission or administrative law
judges assigned to render a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law in a contested case may not communicate, directly or indirectly, in
connection with any issue of law or fact with any agency, person, party, or their
representatives, except on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
Members of the commission or administrative law judges assigned to render a
decision or to make findings of fact or conclusions of law in a contested case may
communicate ex parte with employees of the commission who have not
participated in any hearing in the case for the purpose of utilizing the special skills
or knowledge of the commission and its staff in evaluating the evidence. 169
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VIRGINIA
The applicable statute provides that:
The Commission shall after public hearing, promulgate rules of practice and
procedure pursuant to § 12.1-25 controlling meetings and communications
between commissioners and any party, or between commissioners and staff
concerning any fact or issue arising out of a proceeding involving the regulation
of rates, charges, services or facilities of railroad, telephone, gas or electric
companies. The rules shall provide, among other provisions, that no
commissioner shall consult with any party or any person acting on behalf of any
party with respect to such proceeding without giving adequate notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate. 170
The Virginia Administrative Code provides that commissioners and hearing examiners cannot
consult with a party related to a pending formal proceeding without allowing all parties to
participate. 171 The rules specifically provide:
No commissioner or hearing examiner shall consult with any party or any person
acting on behalf of any party with respect to a pending formal proceeding without
giving adequate notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
The Canon of Judicial Ethics for the State of Virginia applies to members of the State
Corporation Commission. It prohibits any exparte communications other than those for
scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or
issues on the merits. 172
NEVADA
The Nevada Administrative Procedure Act prohibits ex parte contacts for contested cases
except if notice is provided for all parties to participate. 173 Agency members can communicate
with other members of the agency and have the aid of personal assistants. 174
Specifically, it provides that:
Limitations on communications of agency’s members or employees rendering
decision or making findings of fact and conclusions of law. Unless required for
the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, members or employees of
an agency assigned to render a decision or to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in a contested case shall not communicate, directly or
170
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indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with any person or party, nor, in
connection with any issue of law, with any party or the party’s representative,
except upon notice and opportunity to all parties to participate. An agency
member may, subject to the provisions of NRS 233B.123
1. Communicate with other members of the agency.
2. Have the aid and advice of one or more personal assistants.
“Contested case” means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate making and licensing,
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by
an agency after an opportunity for hearing, or in which an administrative penalty may be
imposed. 175
NEW YORK
The New York Administrative Procedure Act exempts public utility proceedings from the
prohibition on ex parte contacts stating it does not apply to “(a) in determining applications for
initial licenses for public utilities or carriers; or (b) to proceedings involving the validity or
application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers.” 176 The APA, however,
does generally apply to other agency proceedings, stating:
Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law,
members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in an adjudicatory proceeding shall not
communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with any
person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his
representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
Any such agency member (a) may communicate with other members of the
agency, and (b) may have the aid and advice of agency staff other than staff which
has been or is engaged in the investigative or prosecuting functions in connection
with the case under consideration or factually related case.
Although ex parte requirements are technically inapplicable to the Public Service Commission,
some commissioners have imposed strict ex parte requirements in their cases. 177 The broad
allowance of ex parte contacts has also been subject to scrutiny. In November 2012, the New
York Governor established a commission called the Moreland Commission to review the
“adequacy of regulatory oversight of the utilities and the mission of the State’s energy agency
and authority functions.” 178 After analyzing the PSC’s ex parte rules, the Moreland Commission
recommended that: “[t]he existing statutory exemption of ex parte rules, the PSC should enact an
implementing regulation that includes a specific triggering event, preferably with a set term prior
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to filing with the PSC, along with sanctions that are sufficient enough to deter violations (i.e.,
fines).” 179
FLORIDA
Florida’s ex parte rules provide that commissioners “shall neither initiate nor consider ex
parte communications” in any proceeding except rulemaking, proceedings related to declaratory
statements by agencies, workshops, or internal affair meetings. 180 Florida’s requirements
generally apply to all proceedings except legislative rulemakings and declaratory actions.:
A commissioner should accord to every person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or the person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and,
except as authorized by law, shall neither initiate nor consider ex parte
communications concerning the merits, threat, or offer of reward in any
proceeding other than a proceeding under s. 120.54 or s. 120.565, workshops, or
internal affairs meetings. No individual shall discuss ex parte with a
commissioner the merits of any issue that he or she knows will be filed with the
commission within 90 days. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
commission staff. 181
Sections 120.54 and 120.565 referenced in the rule above relate to legislative rulemaking and
declaratory actions.
The rules also state that: “No individual shall discuss ex parte with a commissioner the
merits of any issue that he or she knows will be filed with the commission within 90 days.” 182
The ex parte rules do not apply to commissioner advisors and an individual ratepayer
representing themself. 183 If an ex parte communication is made to a commissioner, the
commissioner is required to put it on the record and “may” withdraw from the proceeding. 184
The rules provide:
If a commissioner knowingly receives an ex parte communication relative to a
proceeding other than as set forth in subsection (1), to which he or she is assigned,
he or she must place on the record of the proceeding copies of all written
communications received, all written responses to the communications, and a
memorandum stating the substance of all oral communications received and all
oral responses made, and shall give written notice to all parties to the
179
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communication that such matters have been placed on the record. Any party who
desires to respond to an ex parte communication may do so. The response must be
received by the commission within 10 days after receiving notice that the ex parte
communication has been placed on the record. The commissioner may, if he or
she deems it necessary to eliminate the effect of an ex parte communication
received by him or her, withdraw from the proceeding, in which case the chair
shall substitute another commissioner for the proceeding. 185
If a commissioner knowingly fails to put an ex parte communication on the record, the
commission could be fined. 186 One case fined a commissioner $5000 for failing to put an
improper ex parte contact on the record. 187 The individual making the ex parte communication
also has a duty to document the communication and put it on the record. 188 These rules apply
prior to the case assignment. 189
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